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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ALEXANDRIA DIVISION	
2	ALEXANDRIA DIVISION	
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)	
4		
5	VS.	1:21-CR-179 AJT
6	j	ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA OCTOBER 6, 2021
7	CLAUDIO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ)	,
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14	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING, PLEA, AND SENTENCING BEFORE THE HONORABLE ANTHONY J. TRENGA	
15	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE	
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23		
24	Proceedings reported by stenotype, transcript produced by	
25	Julie A. Goodwin.	
		Tulie A Goodwin CSR RPR

2 APPEARANCES 1 2 FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 3 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE By: MR. JACOB M. GREEN 4 MR. TONY R. ROBERTS Assistant U.S. Attorney 5 2100 Jamieson Avenue Alexandria, Virginia 22314 6 703.299.3700 7 jacob.green3@usdoj.gov UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 8 By: MR. JOSEPH ATTIAS SunTrust Building 9 919 East Main Street Suite 1900 10 Richmond, Virginia 23219 804.819.5400 11 joseph.attias2@usdoj.gov 12 13 FOR THE DEFENDANT: 14 OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER Bv: MS. CADENCE MERTZ 15 MR. RYAN HOPE Assistant Federal Public Defenders 16 1650 King Street Suite 500 17 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 18 703.600.0800 cadence mertz@fd.org 19 20 OFFICIAL U.S. COURT REPORTER: 21 MS. JULIE A. GOODWIN, CSR, RPR United States District Court 22 401 Courthouse Square Eighth Floor 23 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 512.689.7587 24 25 —Julie A. Goodwin, CSR, RPR-

3 1 (OCTOBER 6, 2021, 9:08 A.M., OPEN COURT.) THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Criminal Case Number 21-CR-179, 2 United States of America versus Claudio Alvarez Rodriguez. 3 4 Will Counsel come to the podium and state your name for the record. 5 Good morning, Your Honor. Jake Green, 6 MR. GREEN: 7 Joseph Attias, and Tony Roberts for the United States. 8 THE COURT: Good morning. 9 MR. ROBERTS: Good morning, Your Honor. 10 MS. MERTZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Cadence Mertz and with me is Ryan Hope. He's a volunteer attorney in our 11 12 office for Mr. Alvarez, who is present in the courtroom. THE COURT: All right. Welcome everyone. 13 14 We're here on the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment. I have reviewed the pleadings. Be pleased to hear 15 16 further from counsel. 17 MS. MERTZ: Your Honor, I know the Court will have --18 be very well steeped in the pleadings and familiar with the --19 with what I think is very thorough briefing on both sides, so 20 I'm going to be very brief. I just wanted to make one point 21 crystal clear, which is that the law regarding -- the Supreme 22 Court precedent regarding whether or not the purpose of the 1929 law is imported into the 1952 law is clear and direct and 23 24 not in the government's favor here. 25 The law says that the purpose of the originally

enacted statute does import in the -- in the later reenactment when there's substantive similarity and no statement to the contrary. The cases that the government cites to try to attack that principle don't represent the situation we have here, which is a substantive reenactment of the exact same language with very minimal distinctions.

The two primary cases on which the government relies which are *Abbott v. Perez*, which is a Supreme Court case, and *NAACP v. Raymond*, which is a Fourth Circuit case, in those cases the Courts were talking about, prior provisions that either were not enacted or had been -- in fact, in the *Raymond* case had been rejected, and then the North Carolina Congress came back and made a new law, which had different provisions and was substantively different which was the subject of that opinion.

So it is -- that is not what we have here. We have the Immigration Naturalization Act reenacting substantively the exact same language which became -- which is what we now know as 1326(a). So we -- I just want to highlight that point.

That said, for all of the reasons that we have put in our papers and that the District of Nevada put -- you know, discussed in detail in *Carrillo-Lopez*, the 1952 enact -- reenactment was problematic for its own reasons and had its own racial animus at the -- at that time. That was -- that was a purpose of the reenactment. And the -- and so it is -- this

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   Court does not need to rely entirely on what happened in 1929.
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                Our argument at that -- is that, yes, and -- and
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   the government has previously conceded this in Carrillo-Lopez,
   the 1929 law had as a purpose racial animus.
                                                  But in 1952 that
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   Congress also had racial animus, and so this Court doesn't have
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   to rely entirely on 1929.
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 7
                Your Honor --
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             THE COURT: What's the standard of review in your
   view?
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             MS. MERTZ:
                         I'm sorry.
             THE COURT:
                         What's the standard of review of this
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12
    legislature?
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             MS. MERTZ:
                         Your Honor, our -- for -- for the question
   of whether or not equal protection --
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             THE COURT:
                         Whether it's constitutional --
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16
             MS. MERTZ:
                         Yeah.
             THE COURT: -- or not.
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             MS. MERTZ: Our -- so our -- our argument is that,
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   that this Court should be looking at the test that was laid out
    in Arlington Heights and applying that test, which is whether
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   or not there is -- a purpose was racial animus, and then
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   whether or not there is disproportionate impact, which there
   overwhelmingly is. I don't think the government really --
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   other than pointing to geography, there really isn't almost
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25
   anybody else who has been prosecuted under this statute.
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                And Mr. Alvarez is Mexican. He was born in Mexico.
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   He is in fact who this law originally was intended to target,
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 3
   which was stated in the congressional record, and -- and that's
   been the case consistently for the last hundred years.
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                So with that, Your Honor, if the Court has
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   questions, I would be happy to answer them, but --
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 7
             THE COURT: All right.
                         -- otherwise we -- we believe that this
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             MS. MERTZ:
    law should be struck down at this point.
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             THE COURT: All right. Well, let me ask a question.
   What's the status of the case in the Fourth Circuit on this
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12
    issue?
             MS. MERTZ:
                         It's my understanding and Mister -- I
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14
   think Mr. Attias may know more about this, but I believe it's
   going to be argued next week. And so we're cognizant,
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   obviously, that that is going to happen, and obviously -- it
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   may take a while, obviously, for the Court to issue an opinion,
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18
   but it's my understanding they argue next week.
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             THE COURT: All right.
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                Counsel.
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             THE COURT REPORTER: Can I get your name?
22
             MR. ATTIAS: Joseph Attias, A-T-T-I-A-S.
23
             THE COURT REPORTER:
                                  Thank you.
             MR. ATTIAS: Sure.
24
                Your Honor, the case in the Fourth Circuit was
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listed for the October sitting, but unfortunately, it was pulled off the calendar. So I'm guessing it will end up in early December, but we don't know yet, so there's actually no date yet.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. ATTIAS: So --

THE COURT: It's -- it's an interesting issue where a lot of different strains of constitutional thought seem to, I don't want to say collide, but certainly bump into each other.

MR. ATTIAS: I agree.

THE COURT: Since you're dealing with the immigration area, there seems to be -- there's a whole different approach that courts have adopted.

What struck me, which apparently is not a correct thought, but it occurred to me, since no one's really briefed it or mentioned it, is that, you know, at the border the Fourth Amendment doesn't apply. On admissibility issues, the due process clause doesn't apply. But apparently the equal protection clause in some fashion would apply even though when enacted it would be directed to people who are noncitizens outside of the United States and who would typically not have any standing or constitutional rights. But I understand that's not the analysis that's been adopted anywhere, and it comes down to whether the *Arlington Heights* approach is really even applicable to this context.

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MR. ATTIAS: That -- that's right, Your Honor, and there are different shades of protection, I think if you go through the law. Even Zadvydas -- Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas recognizes that aliens, even illegally here, have certain due process rights --THE COURT: That's after they're here. MR. ATTIAS: Right. THE COURT: Yes. MR. ATTIAS: Is applicable. We think that right is protected by the rational basis review. But even Zadvydas recognizes that the extent of that protection will vary depending on circumstances. THE COURT: Right. MR. ATTIAS: And how you have cases like *Reno versus* American Arab -- American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee which concluded -- that's a Supreme Court decision -- which concluded that aliens unlawfully present in the United States don't have a constitutional right to lodge a selective enforcement challenge to their deportation. That's deportation. It's not a criminal proceeding. But I agree. These questions are definitely complicated. If I could respectfully make a suggestion to the Court which is the way most courts have handled this is to

basically just assume that Arlington Heights applies and -- and

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9
   apply the factors under our --
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             THE COURT:
2
                         Right.
             MR. ATTIAS: -- our argument. The defendant's theory
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   fails notwithstanding applying Arlington Heights. That's also
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   the approach the Supreme Court actually took in Regents.
 5
   don't think it's fair to characterize Regents as having decided
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   that Arlington Heights applies full stop to the immigration
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   context.
                The Supreme Court in Regents was they were faced
   with a situation where the Solicitor General took the position
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   that the rescission of DACA should be subjected to no review,
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   not as to the APA claim, but as to the equal protection claim,
   so they were faced with no review versus Arlington Heights'
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14
   motive probing review. And the Supreme Court just decided to
   apply Arlington Heights, apply all the criteria, and they held
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16
    that the defendants -- well, that the challenger's argument
    failed even under -- under Arlington Heights.
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18
                If I could just make two brief, historical points
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   and then hit on the key -- what I think are the key aspects
20
   of --
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             THE COURT REPORTER: Can you be a little louder?
             MR. ATTIAS: Sure.
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                -- (Continuing) the key aspects of our argument.
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                Number one - and I saw this repeatedly through
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    the -- through the pleadings - there is no such act as the
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Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929. Congress did not pass an act called the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929. I think the confusion can be explained as follows:

On December 28, 1928, Senator Coleman Blease introduced the unlawful reentry provision into the Senate. The House then took that bill and basically sent it back to the Senate substantially in large. What they basically did is attach their own bill to it, and in Section 10 of that bill, they said -- the House said, we're going to call this act the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929.

The reason why they added that provision is because one of the -- one of the major provisions that they added to the Senate's very streamlined 1929 unlawful reentry law was a provision adding eight additional grounds for deportation of certain aliens. Those would have been the undesirables who would have been subject to deportation.

The Senate then got that bill back, and because it was substantially different from what they had sent to the House, the two chambers created a committee. They conferenced; they ironed out their differences, and in the House report detailing the -- in the compromise's House Report 2802, from March 1st, 1929, which is three days before the law was passed, the House specifically states in two places that the House recedes from its proposed amendment to the title of that act.

So as it -- as introduced into the Senate and as

enacted by Congress and signed by the president, there's never been an act called the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929. It's always been called an act making it a felony with penalty for certain aliens to enter the U.S. under certain conditions of violation of the law. So that's historical point number one.

Point number two is that Congress didn't just blindly reenact the 1929 law in 1952. The easiest way of seeing that is because the 1929 law was about this big, and Section 276 in the INA is about this big. So, that's a superficial way of looking at it, but it's clearly not the case that Congress just copied and pasted the law. In fact, made a few important changes.

Number one is that Congress added the found-in clause. The found-in clause is not present in the 1929 law.

Number two, Congress removed the phrase, in pursuance of the law. That phrase was in the 1929 law. They took it out of the 1952 law, and interestingly in Mendoza-Lopez, the Supreme Court identified that phrase in pursuance of the law as a possible textual hook for the right that they would later go on to identify as the right of a -- of the defendant to collaterally challenge their deportation -- their deportation order, what would eventually become 1326(d).

Number three, Congress merged together the 19 seven -- the 1917 and the 1918 unlawful reentry statutes. That applied only to prostitutes and to anarchists. Each of those

provisions had their own penalty. The 1929 law had its own penalty. This is in the center of court. Congress fused the three together and said, this is just a general unlawful reentry's -- unlawful reentry provision. It applies no matter what the reason you are deported, and the penalty is going to be too -- is going to be the same no matter the reason for your deportation.

Congress also defined the phrase -- the term enter in the definition sections in the INA. Previously that phrase was not defined.

And there are other -- there are other changes that Congress made in 1952. The point is Congress didn't just copy and paste the 1929 law and stick it into the INA in 1952.

At the end of the day, though, Your Honor, none of this really matters because we're not here challenge -- we're not here defending the 1929 law. We know from Abbott that even a finding of prior discrimination doesn't flip the burden of proof. And so what that means in this case is that even if the Court concludes as a factual matter or just assumes for the purposes of this motion that in 1929 -- and that's the way most courts have dealt with this issue, that in 1929 Congress passed the unlawful reentry statute out of an impermissible motive. That wouldn't get the defendant -- that would only get the defendant so far because, again, the critical mistake the district court made in Abbott was to put the onus on the law as

defender to purge or expede or cure the taint of the prior law, and that is exactly the argument the defendant makes here.

On page 25 of the defendant's motion, the defendant writes: The Congress made no attempt to remove or distance itself from the 1929 legislation's discriminatory purpose.

Page 26, the defendant says, The absence of any congressional statement to vitiate the racist origins --

THE COURT REPORTER: Can you go a little bit slower?

MR. ATTIAS: Sure.

The absence of any congressional statement in 1952 to vitiate the racist origins and intent of the 1929 statute, dot, dot, dot, defeats the contention that the later enactment cleansed the original statute's discriminatory purpose.

The same thing on page 27, In reenacting the crime of illegal reentry in 1952, Congress could have chosen to reflect on the law's racist origin and consequences, but that didn't happen. And I'm paraphrasing, cutting out a little bit of the middle, that did not happen.

That's exactly the argument, in fact, the same exact word: Cleanse and cure and purge. That's the same language that the Supreme Court found in *Abbott* to be reversible error. And it's actually the same argument the district court in *Abbott* concluded that the legislator in 2013 didn't engage in, quote, any deliberative process. That's exactly the same argument we see here.

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And Raymond, to the extent that there's any daylight between this case and Abbott -- and I agree, Abbott is not exactly on all fours of this case because the procedural posture of *Abbott* is much more complex, but *Raymond* entirely forecloses the defendant's argument. Raymond enacted the very same voter ID provision maybe two, three years after the Fourth Circuit itself had concluded that that provision was passed out of an intent to disenfranchise black voters. The district court in *Raymond* concluded, just like the district court in Abbott, that the law's defenders had to purge, cleanse, expede the taint of the prior enactment. The Fourth Circuit looked at that, applied *Abbott*, and said that that's reversible error. And that's exact same argument the defendant makes here. Your Honor, I'm happy to answer any other questions --THE COURT: All right. Thank you. MR. ATTIAS: -- to sit down. THE COURT: Ms. Mertz, I'll give you the last word on this. Thank you, Your Honor. MS. MERTZ: Your Honor, I think we would just point the Court back to the case law, to the distinctions between *Abbott* and Raymond in this case and, again, remind the Court of Hunter v. *Underwood*, which is very similar in terms of the situation that

the Court was confronted with there, sort of a fomented environment leading up, culminating and the passage of a racist voter disenfranchising the statute. And in that -- in that case, the Court -- the Court applied, did look back at the historical context, which is what *Arlington Heights* instructs the Courts to do.

And -- and what it was confronted with was something similar to what we saw building in the '20s and in the '50s aimed at Mexicans and other Latino people and -- and could see that the motivation despite in the *Hunter* case many amendments to that -- to that law, where provisions had over time been stripped away, taking away criminal conduct that could be considered disenfranchising, whereas in this case the only thing that has happened to the illegal reentry statute is to ratchet up the penalties over time, although not really amendments to 1326(a) which is separate obviously from B and D.

In any event, we would just point the Court back to the case law, which we think is very clear in terms of how the Court should approach its analysis, why this case is not like Abbott and Raymond, we are talking about. And essentially not a cut and paste, because they didn't have that then, but an importation of the identical language with the minor distinction which was propagated by I believe it was attorney -- Attorney General Ford, that was intended to target Mexicans. And although the government has sort of tried to

diminish that point because he was not a legislature, that is the one amendment that was made in 1952 to the language that already had existed.

So, Your Honor, we would just point the Court back to the Supreme Court law here that should govern the steps for the analysis.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

I've reviewed the briefing in this case, as well as the many cases that have already considered this issue, and I'm not sure I can meaningfully add to the writings on and opinions on this that have already been issued. This issue is before the Fourth Circuit, and I suspect would likely eventually reach -- reach the Supreme Court.

In any event, I've reviewed the arguments on both sides and concludes that in Section 30 1323 does withstand constitutional scrutiny under the equal protection clause and is not unconstitutional based on an impermissible motive in its -- in its origins or its provenance.

So for the reasons -- those reasons and also for the reasons that have been already stated in the case of *United States versus Francisco Eduardo Palacios Arias*, which is an opinion by Judge Gibney and from our Richmond Division, which the Court adopts, the Court's going to deny the motion to dismiss.

All right. How do we proceed from here?

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MS. MERTZ: Your Honor, in that case, the parties have
anticipated how to proceed and have prepared conditional plea
paperwork, which Mr. Alvarez Rodriguez has reviewed and already
signed so that -- for the purpose of moving forward smoothly.
            If the Court would take a conditional plea today,
we would ask the Court to do that and proceed immediately to
sentencing.
             I know the government yesterday filed their --
         THE COURT:
                     Yes.
         MS. MERTZ: -- position on sentencing. We would be
prepared to orally proffer some history, and that there's
agreement on the guideline applicability here.
            Mr. Alvarez Rodriguez is prepared to do that now.
And if the Court is willing, we would ask the Court to go
forward with that. And again, it would be a conditional plea,
which is what the parties have agreed to, preserving this one
single issue.
         THE COURT:
                     All right.
            What's the government's position on this?
         MR. GREEN: Your Honor, we -- we agree with the
defense.
         We have no problem moving forward with the
conditional plea and -- and immediate sentencing.
         THE COURT: All right. Hold on a second.
    (BRIEF PAUSE.)
         THE COURT:
                     Is a conditional plea, Counsel,
specifically governed by Rule 11?
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             MS. MERTZ:
                         Yes, Your Honor, (a)(2).
 1
             THE COURT:
                         I'm sorry?
 2
                         Yes, Rule 11(a)(2).
             MS. MERTZ:
 3
             THE COURT:
                         (a)(2)?
 4
             MS. MERTZ:
                         Yes.
 5
             THE COURT:
                         I see.
                                 Thank you.
6
 7
                All right.
                            The Court will proceed.
8
                All right.
                            Defendant will come to the podium,
9
   please, and be sworn.
10
        (DEFENDANT COMPLIES.)
11
             THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Please raise your right hand.
12
        (THE OATH WAS ADMINISTERED TO DEFENDANT.)
             THE COURT: Would you state your full name, please.
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             THE DEFENDANT:
                             Claudio Rodriguez Alvarez.
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             THE COURT: Mr. Alvarez, the purpose of this hearing
    is to give you the opportunity to enter a conditional plea to
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   the charge of illegally reentering the United States after
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   having been removed, after having been convicted of a felony.
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    If you enter such a plea, it will be the responsibility of this
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   Court to ensure that your plea is entered voluntarily.
21
    is, that no one is forcing you to enter a guilty plea against
22
   your will, and that your guilty plea is not being entered in
   exchange for any promises or agreements.
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                The Court also will have the responsibility to
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   ensure that your plea is entered knowingly. That is, that you
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   understand the consequences of pleading guilty. And in order
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   for the Court to make those determinations, I'm going to ask
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   you a series of questions, and for that purpose, you've been
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   placed under oath.
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                And having been placed under oath, you have the
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   obligation to answer all of the Court's questions truthfully.
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7
   If any of your answers prove to be untrue, you may be
   subjecting yourself to additional criminal penalties, including
    those for perjury based on the responses you give here in court
10
   today.
11
                Do you understand that?
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             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: What is your age?
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             THE DEFENDANT:
14
                             46.
15
             THE COURT: And what is your highest level of formal
   education?
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17
             THE DEFENDANT:
                             12th grade.
18
             THE COURT: And you read, write, and understand the
19
    English language. Is that correct?
20
             THE DEFENDANT:
                            Yes, sir.
21
             THE COURT: And of what country are you a citizen?
             THE DEFENDANT:
22
                             Mexico.
23
             THE COURT: And what is your status here in the United
24
   States?
25
             THE DEFENDANT: What's my status?
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             THE COURT: Yes.
 1
             THE DEFENDANT: I don't understand.
 2
                No, Your Honor, I don't have --
 3
             THE COURT: You have no status?
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             THE DEFENDANT:
 5
                             No.
             THE COURT: All right.
 6
 7
                You've been represented by a lawyer in connection
   with this case. Is that correct?
9
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
             THE COURT: You've been represented by a lawyer.
10
11
                Have you met with your lawyer?
12
             THE DEFENDANT: You're my lawyer. Right?
                Yes. Yes, Your Honor. Sorry.
13
14
             THE COURT: And has your lawyer explained to you the
   charge against you and what the government must prove in order
15
16
    to convict you of that charge?
17
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
18
             THE COURT: Has your lawyer explained to you the
19
   consequences of pleading guilty?
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
20
21
             THE COURT: Have you provided to your lawyer all the
22
    facts and information you have and know that may relate to this
23
   charge?
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
24
25
             THE COURT: Have you understood -- have you had all
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1
   you would plead guilty is illegally reentering after removal
   and having been convicted of a felony?
2
 3
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
 4
             THE COURT: And do you understand that by entering a
   guilty plea you will be convicted of that charge, just as if
 5
   you had gone to trial on a plea of not guilty and were
6
7
   convicted by a jury?
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
8
9
             THE COURT: Has your lawyer explained to you the
   maximum punishment you could receive based on the conviction
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   that would result from your guilty plea?
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12
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
13
             THE COURT: The maximum punishment you could receive
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    is a term of imprisonment up to ten years, a fine of up to
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   $250,000, a $100 special assessment that will be imposed, and a
16
   period of supervised release of up to three years.
17
                Do you understand that's the maximum punishment you
18
   could receive?
19
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: I understand that you have not entered
21
    into any written plea agreements. Is that correct?
22
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
23
             MS. MERTZ: Your Honor, actually there is a written
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   plea agreement.
25
             THE COURT:
                         There is a plea agreement? All right.
                                                                  Do
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23
   you have a copy of it?
1
             THE DEFENDANT: Oh, sorry.
 2
             MS. MERTZ: Yes, Your Honor.
 3
             THE COURT: Is there a statement of facts as well?
 4
             MS. MERTZ: Yes.
 5
             THE COURT: All right. I understand you have entered
6
7
   into a written plea agreement. Do you have that in front of
8
   you?
9
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor.
10
             THE COURT: Does your signature appear on that
   document?
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12
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: And you signed that document?
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             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Did you read that document?
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             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Did you have all your questions answered
18
   about that document?
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: And did you understand everything in that
21
   document?
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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23
             THE COURT: Did anyone threaten you or try to
    influence you in any way into signing that written plea
24
25
   agreement against your will?
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THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is this written plea agreement the entire agreement you think you have with the United States government?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you think you have any other promises or agreements or understandings in exchange for your guilty plea, your conditional guilty plea, that's not in this written plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: If you were to go to trial in this case, and if after that trial you were convicted, you would have the right to appeal that conviction and any sentence to a higher court. Under this plea agreement, you waive, that is you give up your right of appeal, both as to the conviction that would result from your guilty plea and any sentence imposed based on that conviction.

Do you understand you've waived your right of appeal?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Also under this plea agreement, the government agrees to make certain recommendations. You understand those are only recommendations. They're not binding on the Court. Only the Court will decide what sentence to impose in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Do you understand that your guilty plea
will be binding on you for the purposes of any immigration
proceedings?
         THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: Do you understand that as a result of this
conviction there may be immigration consequences?
         THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: And is it your decision to enter a guilty
plea here today regardless of what the immigration consequences
are?
         THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: Have you discussed with your lawyer the
rights you have as someone charged with a crime and that you
would waive, that is give up those rights by pleading guilty?
         THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: You have the absolute right to proceed to
a public and speedy trial before a jury of 12 United States
citizens.
            Do you understand that?
         THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: And in order to convict you of this
charge, that jury must unanimously find you guilty.
            Do you understand that?
         THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: At that trial you would be entitled to be
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represented by a lawyer, and if you could not afford one, one would be appointed for you. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Also at that trial you would be presumed innocent of this charge, and the government would have the obligation of proving each and every element of this charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Also at that trial you and your lawyer would have the right to confront any witnesses that the government presented, to cross-examine those witnesses and to challenge the admissibility of any evidence that the government offered. Do you understand? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Also at that trial you and your lawyer would have the right to present your own defense, and that would include the right to require any person with relevant information to be brought into court and to testify and to bring with him or her any documents relevant to this charge. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Also at that trial, as part of your

defense, you could testify yourself. You could take the witness stand, be placed under oath, and testify subject to cross-examination, but you would have absolutely no obligation to testify. You could remain silent in the face of this charge, and if you decided not to testify, the government could not force you to testify or to incriminate yourself in any way.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Also if you made the decision not to testify, no inference of guilt could be inferred from the fact that you decided not to testify. You would continue to be presumed innocent of this charge, and the government would continue to have the obligation of proving each and every element of this charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And as I mentioned earlier, if after that trial you were convicted, you would have the right to appeal that conviction and any sentence to a higher court.

Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Having heard all these rights that you have and that you would give up all these rights by pleading guilty is it still your decision to enter a conditional guilty plea here today?

28 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 1 THE COURT: In addition to the rights that I have 2 3 mentioned that you would give up, there will be other collateral consequences of your entering your guilty plea, 4 including the forfeiture of any right you might have to vote, 5 hold public office, serve on a jury, possess a firearm. 6 7 Do you understand that? 8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Have you discussed with your lawyer how the Court would go about deciding what sentence to impose in 10 your case? 11 12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Have you discussed what we call the 14 Sentencing Guidelines and how they pertain to you and your offense? 15 16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Those are only guidelines. They're not 18 binding on the Court. Only the Court will decide what sentence 19 to impose. It may impose a guideline sentence, and it may 20 impose a sentence greater than the guidelines or less than the 21 guidelines, obligated only to impose a sentence within the 22 maximum punishment that I described to you. 23 Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 24 25 THE COURT: And in addition to the guidelines, the

Court would consider a whole range of other factors, including the nature and seriousness of this offense, your own personal history and characteristics and generally what sentence will be sufficient, but no more than necessary to constitute a just punishment and to protect the public.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Also as I mentioned earlier, only the Court is going to decide what sentence to impose so that if you receive a sentence that is different than what the government recommends or that your lawyer recommends, or if you receive a sentence that is different than someone told you you're likely to receive or that you're expecting, or if you receive a sentence that you just think is unfair in some way, you nevertheless are going to be bound by your guilty plea, and you will not be permitted to withdraw your guilty plea after you hear what the sentence is.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I understand that there will be a request that the Court sentence you today. Do you understand the Court may or may not do that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And is it your decision to enter a guilty plea here today regardless of whether the Court sentences you

today?

2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: In a moment I'm going to ask the government to tell the Court what evidence it would present against you if this case were to go to trial. I want you to listen carefully to what the government tells the Court, because when the government's done, I'm going to ask you whether you disagree with anything the government has told the Court about your conduct.

Have a seat for a moment, and we'll hear from the government.

MR. GREEN: Your Honor, at trial, the United States would have proven the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt with admissible and credible evidence.

The defendant is a native and citizen of Mexico, who does not have lawful status in the United States and is an alien for the purposes of Title 8, U.S. Code, Section 1326.

On -- on or about December 31st, 2001, the defendant was convicted of a felony in the Superior Court for Los Angeles County, California. The defendant was removed from the United States pursuant to a final order of removal on or about September 12th, 2002, from at or near Calexico, California. Thereafter, the defendant reentered the United States.

He was removed from the United States pursuant to

an order of expedited removal on or about February 15th, 2003, from at or near San Ysidro, California. Thereafter, the defendant reentered the United States.

He was removed from the United States pursuant to a reinstatement of a removal order on or about February 2nd, 2004, from at or near San Ysidro, California.

On or about July 14th, 2021, United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Officers found the
defendant, who was being held on local charges, at the
Rappahannock Regional Jail in Rappahannock County, Virginia,
within the Eastern District of Virginia.

At no time prior to his reentry, and at no time thereafter, did the defendant obtain the consent of the Attorney General of the United States or the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to reenter the United States or reapply for admission to the United States.

This statement of facts includes those facts necessary to support the defendant's plea of guilty to the charge listed in the indictment in this case, does not include each and every fact known to the defendant or to the United States, and is not intended to be a full enumeration of all the facts surrounding the defendant's case.

The actions of the defendant, as recounted here, were in all respects knowing and deliberate and were not committed by mistake, accident, or other innocent reason.

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             THE COURT: Thank you.
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                Mr. Rodriguez, would you return to the podium,
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   please.
        (DEFENDANT COMPLIES.)
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             THE COURT: Do you disagree with anything the
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   government has told the Court about your conduct?
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             THE DEFENDANT: No. Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: I understand you've also signed a written
    statement of facts. Is that correct?
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             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: Do you have that document in front of you?
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             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: Your signature appears on that document,
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   and you signed that document. Is that correct?
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             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Did you read, understand, and have all
   your questions answered about that document?
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             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Did anyone threaten you or try to
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    influence you in any way into signing that written statement of
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    facts against your will?
             THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Are these -- is this written -- are the
   statements in this written statement of facts true and correct?
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             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: And is it your decision to enter a
conditional guilty plea here today because you are, in fact,
quilty subject to your preservation of your issue raised on
your motion to dismiss?
         THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: Counsel, based on everything you know, is
there an adequate factual basis for the plea in this case?
                     Yes, Your Honor.
         MS. MERTZ:
         THE COURT:
                     Before pleading further to the indictment,
would you like to speak with your lawyer?
         THE DEFENDANT:
                         No. Your Honor.
         THE COURT: With respect to count one of the
indictment, charging illegally reentering the United States
after having been removed and after having been convicted of a
felony in violation of Title 8, U.S. Code, Section 1326(a) and
(b)(1), how do you plead, guilty or not guilty?
         THE DEFENDANT:
                         Guilty.
         THE COURT: All right.
            Let the record reflect that based on the responses
of this defendant through the Court's questions,
representations of counsel for the government and for the
defendant, it's a finding of this Court in the case of United
States versus Claudio Alvarez Rodriguez that the defendant is
fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that
the nature -- defendant is aware of the nature of the charges
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and the consequences of the plea, and that the plea of guilty is a knowing and voluntary plea supported by an independent basis and fact containing each of the essential elements of the offense. The conditional plea is therefore accepted, and defendant is now adjudged guilty of that offense subject to his preserving for review the Court's adverse determination on his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment.

I understand the government does not oppose immediate sentencing?

MR. GREEN: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Does the government want to be heard on that issue?
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MR. GREEN: On sentencing --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I've read your memorandum.

MR. GREEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I'll just speak briefly since I know you've seen the sentencing position paper that we've put forward.

We've asked for a sentence of three to four months. We agree with defense that the guideline range is between zero to six months, and we do think there are circumstances in this case that differentiate from sort of a run-of-the-mill case where we would support a time-served sentence.

In this case, there are three prior removals, as -- as the Court knows and as the defendant has admitted.

In addition to that, there's a fairly extensive criminal history, albeit old. The defendant has a prior felony. And then in addition, you know, just looking at the general criminal history, it goes back to -- you know, mainly between 2000 and 2004, there's domestic violence, there's vehicle theft, there's drug possession, all the while while being removed from and then reentering the United States. And then now it's, you know, basically a 16- to 17-year gap where the defendant is, you know, for all intents and purposes unaccounted for. And then we have recent charges at the state level which involved drug possession and also a false identification to a law enforcement officer.

So, what we know about the defendant is that he had a lengthy criminal history, and then essentially no record for a long period of time. We don't know where he was during that time, but now we know that he has state charges and of course those haven't been resolved yet. But for that reason, you know, there's -- there is no facts to conclude that the defendant has changed his ways. It's a possibility, but the recent charges suggest that certainly has and especially given the drug charge related to his state conduct, and so instead what we have is multiple prior removals, returning to the United States, sometime between now and 2004, and then getting

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more state charges that have yet to be revolved.
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                On the other hand, the defendant has accepted
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   responsibility for his conduct, and so for that reason we think
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   the appropriate middle ground is a three to four-month
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   sentence, what should be approximately one additional month
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   beyond what the defendant has already served.
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             THE COURT: He's been in custody since -- federal
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   custody since July 15. Is that --
             MR. GREEN: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: All right.
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             MR. GREEN:
                         That's all I have, unless the Court has
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   questions.
13
             THE COURT:
                        All right. Thank you.
             MR. GREEN:
                         Thank you, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Ms. Mertz.
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             MS. MERTZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                Your Honor, just to frame the math here, he has
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   been in custody since July 15th, Marshals custody; was taken
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    into ICE custody the day before. He actually was in custody
    since June 23rd, on credited state time.
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                So actually, we are asking for time served, but
   we're not far apart at all --
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             THE COURT:
                         Right.
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             MS. MERTZ: -- if apart at all. We're not -- there's
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-Julie A. Goodwin, CSR, RPR-

really not much daylight there.

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Time served in this case would be about three and a Mr. Alvarez -- that's a longer period than would half months. normally be requested for time served in a zero to six month case, largely a function of litigating this motion to dismiss, which has taken a little bit longer than the parties usually would resolve the case maybe more quickly. But in any event --THE COURT: Where was he in state custody? MS. MERTZ: Rappahannock Regional Jail. He was arrested in Spotsylvania on possession of -- a possession charge. THE COURT: All right. MS. MERTZ: So he was there three weeks and has a court date tomorrow which was the next scheduled court date. THE COURT: All right. MS. MERTZ: It's a coincidence, but it's tomorrow. Your Honor, Mr. Alvarez was brought to this country as a toddler in the 1970s. He was educated here. Literally his entire family is here. His parents are citizens. All of his siblings are His wife is a citizen. She's a born American citizens. citizen, just to distinguish that from naturalization. He has children who are all American citizens. His wife is pregnant. He's lived -- as you can hear from his --

you know, he doesn't need an interpreter. He is -- feels

American. He's been here since he was a toddler, so it is difficult for him to -- to return to Mexico, but he is aware of the consequences, obviously having spent this time in custody.

 ${\rm I}$ -- ${\rm I}$ want to push back on this, the government's notion of his criminal record.

He had lawful status as a child. He was granted first temporary residency and then permanent residency. And he did fall into drug addiction in the late '90s and early 2000s and did have a criminal record at that time.

That was actually, unfortunately, while he had lawful status, and it is the reason he lost that status and was deported in 2002. But since then, he actually -- although he did come back twice thereafter trying to get into the country, and obviously a third time successfully, he has done everything to show that he has reformed his life.

He moved across the country -- his whole family is in California -- and he has lived without any incident for almost 20 years. So I would strongly dispute this characterization that we don't know, you know, what his trajectory is and that he hasn't given any facts to -- to show that he has reformed.

He does have a pending drug charge, and we all know that addiction is a difficult thing. But it's a possession charge. It is not something other than that.

Your Honor, he's already served three and a half

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months.
         I won't belabor the point, but we think time served
here is appropriate and that would be three and a half months.
         THE COURT:
                     All right.
         MS. MERTZ:
                     Again, this is a zero to six-month case,
so we're talking about the center of the range.
         THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
            Mr. Rodriguez, you have the right to address the
Court before it decides whether to sentence you and what that
sentence should be, if it decides to sentence you.
         THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry. Excuse me?
         THE COURT: Yes. You have the opportunity to address
the Court if you would like to say anything --
         THE DEFENDANT:
                        Your Honor --
         THE COURT: -- before it decides what sentence --
         THE DEFENDANT: -- I apologize for any wrongdoings or
any felonies or things that I have done wrong in the past. I
mean, like she says, I've been here my whole life. I mean,
this -- all I know is United States. I don't know nothing from
Mexico.
            I mean, the reason I came back was because of my
family.
         I have none -- I have nobody there. I mean, if I were
to stay there, I would be living in the streets because I have
nowhere to live.
            I've been married for 15 years now. I mean, I have
three kids, and my wife is pregnant now. I mean, I have
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nothing -- I have nothing in Mexico for me, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

The Court's reviewed the file, and based on the file of the Court finds it has sufficient information to meaningfully exercise its sentencing authority and will proceed with sentencing.

In that regard, the defendant is -- guideline sentence is zero to six months based on the criminal history of I. The Court has also considered the sentencing factors under Section 3553, including the nature and seriousness of the offense and the defendant's own personal history and characteristics.

The Court has also considered the details of the criminal history, including the age of the convictions and the nature of those convictions. The Court has also considered the amount of time that he has spent in custody and that he'll continue to remain in immigration custody following his completion of any sentence.

The Court has also considered his acceptance of responsibility. The Court's in a position to impose sentence at this time.

Mr. Rodriguez, it will be the sentence of this

Court that you be committed to the Bureau of Prisons for a

period of time served following which you'll be placed on

supervised release for a period of two years under the standard

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   terms and conditions, and also upon your completion of your
    incarceration you'll be surrendered to a duly-authorized
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   representative of Homeland Security for any deportation
   proceedings.
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                And if deported, you'll remain outside the United
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   States and not reenter without the written consent of the
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   Attorney General. And your supervised release will also be
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   subject to the other standard terms and -- terms and
   conditions. And that will be the sentence of the Court.
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                The Court will not impose a fine.
                                                    The Court will
    impose a $100 special assessment.
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                All right. Anything further?
             MR. GREEN: No, Your Honor.
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             MS. MERTZ: No, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Counsel are
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   excused.
              Defendant is remanded.
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               (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 9:55 A.M.)
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                                              -Julie A. Goodwin, CSR, RPR-
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   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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    EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
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                I, JULIE A. GOODWIN, Official Court Reporter for
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    the United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia,
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    do hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
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    from the record of proceedings in the above matter, to the best
   of my ability.
                I further certify that I am neither counsel for,
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    related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in
   which this proceeding was taken, and further that I am not
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    financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the
   action.
13
                Certified to by me this 15TH day of DECEMBER, 2021.
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18
                                    /s/
                                  JULIE A. GOODWIN. RPR
                                  Official U.S. Court Reporter
19
                                  401 Courthouse Square
20
                                  Eighth Floor
                                  Alexandria, Virginia 22314
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-Julie A. Goodwin, CSR, RPR-